Does Merit-Based Aid Improve College Affordability? Testing the Bennett Hypothesis in the Era of Merit-Based Aid by Lee, Jungmin
Journal of Student Financial Aid
Volume 46 | Issue 2 Article 4
8-1-2016
Does Merit-Based Aid Improve College
Affordability? Testing the Bennett Hypothesis in
the Era of Merit-Based Aid
Jungmin Lee
University of Kentucky, jungmin.lee@uky.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jsfa
Part of the Higher Education Commons, and the Higher Education Administration Commons
This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Student Financial Aid by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional
Repository. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee, Jungmin (2016) "Does Merit-Based Aid Improve College Affordability? Testing the Bennett Hypothesis in the Era of Merit-Based
Aid," Journal of Student Financial Aid: Vol. 46 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jsfa/vol46/iss2/4
Does Merit-Based Aid Improve College Affordability? Testing the Bennett
Hypothesis in the Era of Merit-Based Aid
Cover Page Footnote
I gratefully acknowledge support from the Association for Institutional Research, the National Science
Foundation, the National Center for Education Statistics, and the National Postsecondary Education
Cooperative under Association for Institutional Research Grant Number DG 12-10. I am also grateful to two
anonymous reviewers and Dr. John Thelin for their comments, although any errors are my own.
This research article is available in Journal of Student Financial Aid: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/jsfa/vol46/iss2/4
 
Journal of Student Financial Aid  National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators  Vol. 46, N2, 2016 51 
Does Merit-Based Aid Improve College Affordability? Testing the Bennett 
Hypothesis in the Era of Merit-Based Aid 




This study tested the Bennett hypothesis by examining whether four-year colleges changed listed 
tuition and fees, the amount of institutional grants per student, and room and board charges after 
their states implemented statewide merit-based aid programs. According to the Bennett 
hypothesis, increases in government financial aid make it easier for colleges to raise their tuition. 
Because many statewide merit-based aid programs covered full tuition and fees for students 
enrolled in their state colleges, I hypothesized that colleges in states that implemented merit-based 
aid programs would raise student charges or reduce institutional aid for more revenue. Using the 
difference-in-differences method, I analyzed data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) from 1987 to 2009. My results showed that colleges significantly changed 
their prices, but did not always increase the net price that students had to pay. Public colleges in 
many states with merit-based aid reduced published tuition and fees and increased the amount of 
institutional grants per student. These results suggest that the implementation of merit-based aid 











ollege affordability has become an important concern across the country. According to a national 
survey in 2009, more than half of American adults surveyed believe that academically qualified 
students do not have enough opportunities for college education in spite of its importance to their 
future success (Immerwahr et al., 2010). Rising college costs and student debt levels also suggest that college 
education is out of reach even for those coming from middle-income households. To mitigate the financial 
burden of students and families, governments and colleges have spent a huge amount of money on financial 
aid. In 2010, federal and state governments invested approximately $141.3 billion, and colleges spent $29.7 
billion on undergraduate financial aid (College Board, 2011).  
 
Among many scholarship programs, statewide merit-based aid is a new type of financial aid that covers 
tuition and fees for in-state college students exclusively based on their academic merit. Due to its simple 
rules and broad coverage, statewide merit-based aid has become widely available across the country and 
gained lots of attention from researchers. To date, researchers have shown that merit-based aid largely 
increased freshman enrollments across all racial groups, particularly in four-year public colleges (Cornwell, 
Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2002). Given these results, it seems that merit-based aid is successful at 
boosting freshman enrollments. However, little is known about its other potential, and possibly negative, 
effects on students and colleges.  
 
 
Jungmin Lee is an assistant professor at the Department of Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation at the University of Kentucky. 
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One of the potential consequences is its impact on college tuition as suggested in the Bennett hypothesis. 
According to the Bennett hypothesis, increases in federal aid make it easier for colleges to raise their tuition 
because the aid will help students pay tuition (Bennett, 1987). The hypothesis seems plausible in the case of 
merit aid, given that merit aid programs cover a substantial portion of listed tuition and fees for a majority 
of students in state public colleges. If state governments are covering the full cost of tuition, then why 
would students care if their colleges increase tuition and fees? 
 
This study examined how colleges responded to the creation of statewide merit-based aid and the impact 
of these responses on college affordability. Although many studies have reported the positive impact of 
financial aid on student demand, little is known about its impact on the supply side (Leslie & Brinkman, 
1987; Heller, 1997). Understanding institutional responses to financial aid is important because colleges can 
modify the impact of financial aid by changing tuition, room and board charges, and the amount of 
institutional grants (Long, 2004). This study investigated a relatively unexplored area of institutional 
responses to financial aid, and tested whether a financial aid policy that provided institutions with different 
incentives was as effective as originally intended. Results from this study can inform state policymakers who 
are interested in whether their merit-based aid has improved college affordability, especially given the recent 





Since the early 1990s, statewide merit-based aid has been popular across the country. After Arkansas started 
its Academic Challenge Scholarship in 1991, more than a dozen states implemented statewide merit-based 
aid programs. By the 2010-11 academic year, all but seven states provided non-need-based aid, with some 
state aid considering financial need as well as academic performance (NASSGAP, 2011). Following the 
example of previous studies (e.g., Dynarski, 2002; Zhang & Ness, 2010), I defined statewide merit-based aid 
programs as those which determined eligibility solely by students’ academic achievement and those that 
targeted a wide population of resident students rather than a few elite students. Using this standard, a 
financial aid program that determined eligibility by both financial need and academic performance (e.g., Cal 
Grant A) was not considered. Table 1 summarizes each of these programs’ inception year, eligibility 
requirements, and award amounts when each program was first implemented. In some states, eligibility 
standards and award amounts have changed over time. Because my study examined changes in student costs 
right before and after states implemented merit-based aid, I focused on the academic requirements and 
award amounts applied when each aid program was first implemented.  
 
According to Table 1, merit-based aid programs have some common features, although their academic 
requirements and award amounts differ. First, most programs set the academic standard around a 3.0 high 
school GPA. This standard made it possible for these programs to benefit a large number of resident 
students considering that approximately “40% of high school seniors in 1999 met this standard” across the 
country (Dynarski, 2002, p. 64). Second, most programs covered more than half of tuition and fees at their 
state’s public four-year colleges, especially after each of these programs was adopted. 
 
Table 2 provides the average tuition and fees at public and private four-year institutions when each state 
started its merit-based aid program. Several states (e.g., Georgia and Florida) subsidized 100% of tuition and 
fees for students enrolled in public four-year colleges, while other states, such as New Mexico and Nevada, 
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Table 1. Statewide Merit-Based Scholarship Programs 
 
State 
(Start Year) Initial Criteria Award Amounts Per Year 
Alaska 
(1999/2011) 
1. UA Scholars Program  
• (UA System only; top 10% of graduating class) 
2. Alaska Performance Scholarship  
1) 3.5 GPA & 25 ACT or 1680 SAT 
2) 3.0 GPA & 23 ACT or 1560 SAT 









Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship 
• 2.5 GPA in HS core & 19 ACT 
Public & Private:  
1st year: $2,500 
2nd year: $2,750 
3rd year: $3,000 
4th year: $3,500 
Florida 
(1997) 
Florida Bright Futures Scholarship (two-tiered) 
1. Florida Academic Scholar 
H.S. (3.5 GPA & 1270 SAT or 28 ACT) 
2. Florida Medallion Scholar 
H.S. (3.0 GPA & 970 SAT or 20 ACT) 
Public 
1. 100% tuition & fees 
2. 75% tuition & fees 
Private 
The average public tuition & fees 
Georgia 
(1993) 
Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally 
• 3.0 GPA 




Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship 
• 2.5 GPA 
Public: $125-$2,500 
Private: Equivalent 
(Award varies based on a high school 
GPA from 9th to 12th grade. 
Additionally, students can earn a bonus 




Taylor Opportunity Program for Students (three-tiered) 
1. Honors Award 
• 3.0 GPA & 27 ACT  
2. Performance Award 
• 3.0 GPA & 23 ACT 
3. Opportunity Award 
• 2.5 GPA & ACT score above the state’s average  
Public: 
1. Tuition & fees + $800 
2. Tuition & fees + $400 
3. Tuition & fees 
 




The John and Abigail Adams Scholarship  
• Score “advanced” or “proficient” and top 25%  
of graduating class in their district in MCAS  
math and English 




Maryland HOPE Scholarship 
• 3.0 GPA in HS Core 
Public & private: $3,000 
(subject to availability of fund) 
Michigan 
(2000-2008) 
Michigan Merit Award & Promise Scholarship 
• Level2 on all four components of MEAP test or 
• Level2 on two components of MEAP test and 
75th percentile of SAT/ACT 
In-state public & private: $2,500 
Out-of-state public & private: $1,000 
Not renewable (one-time award) 
Mississippi 
(1996) 
1. Mississippi Resident Tuition Assistance Grant 
(MTAG)  
• GPA & 15 ACT 
2. Mississippi Eminent Scholars Grant (MESG) 
• GPA & 29 ACT 
Public & private:  
Freshman/Sophomore: $500 
Junior/Senior: $1,000 
Up to $2,500 per year (no more than 
tuition and fees) 
continued on next page 
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Table 1–Continued. Statewide Merit-Based Scholarship Programs 
 
State 
(Start Year) Initial Criteria Award Amounts Per Year 
Missouri 
(1987) 
Bright Flight Scholarship 
• Top 3-5% of all MO students taking either ACT 
or SAT 
Up to $3,000 for public and private, 




• 3.0 GPA & pass the state’s exit exam 
Public only: 
Up to $2,500  
New Mexico 
(1997) 
Lottery Success Scholarship 
• No high school criteria 
• GPA at the first semester in college 




• 3.0 GPA and 1100 SAT or 24ACT 
Public and private: $2,000 
Tennessee 
(2004) 
Tennessee Educational Lottery Scholarship (four-tiered) 
1. GAMS 
• 3.75 GPA & 28 ACT 
2. HOPE Base 
• 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT 
3. ASPIRE 
• 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT & adjusted gross income 
<$36,000 
4. ACCESS 
• 2.75 GPA & 18 ACT & adjusted gross income 
<$36,000 








• 3.0 GPA & 1000 SAT or 21 ACT 
Public: Tuition & fees 
Private: Average tuition & fees 
Sources: Dynarski (2002); Dynarksi (2005); Hu, Trengove, and Zhang (2012); Orsuwan & Heck (2009); Zhang & Ness (2010); 
States’ web sites. 
 
 
Lastly, most of these programs, except those in Massachusetts, Nevada, and New Mexico, provided 
students enrolled in private colleges in their states with amounts equivalent to those provided to their 
students in public institutions. The amount was not sufficient, but it still helped these students to pay their 
tuition. Considering the lenient academic standards and generous award amounts, merit-based aid might be 





I grounded this study on the Bennett hypothesis and Bowen’s revenue theory of costs. The Bennett 
hypothesis suggests that colleges increase listed tuition and fees to capture additional revenue resulting from 
an increase in federal financial aid. Although the hypothesis was initially proposed to predict tuition changes 
in responses to increases in federal aid, researchers also tested the hypothesis against increases in state aid 
(e.g., Long, 2004). This study also tested the hypothesis against creation of statewide merit-based aid.  
 
The Bennett hypothesis rests on the revenue theory of costs, which argues that colleges try to increase 
revenue as long as it does not harm their reputations (Bowen, 1980). According to Bowen, there is a spiral 
effect among college finances (including tuition and institutional aid), educational quality, and reputation. 
Colleges with large external subsidies from governments and philanthropies can afford charging less for  
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Table 2. Merit-Based Aid Award Amounts and the Average Tuition Levels 
 
State Minimum Award Amount 
Average Tuition & Fees (in Current Dollars) 
Public Four-Year Private Four-Year 
AK $2,378 $5,578 $21,070 
AR $2,500 $1,805 $5,721 
FL 
Public: 75% to 100% of tuition & fees 
Private: Weighted average tuition & fees of Public 4-year 
colleges 
$1,911 $11,525 





(Depending H.S GPA & ACT score) $2,723 $9,614 
LA 
Public: Tuition & fees 
Private: Weighted average tuition & fees of public 4-year 
colleges 
$2,390 $14,003 
MA Tuition only (up to 8 semesters) $7,290 $27,335 
MD $3,000 $5,406 $20,156 
MI $1,250 (for the first two years) $4,615 $11,155 
MO Up to $3,000 (depending on funding availability) $1,532 $7,170 
MS 
MTAG: 
Freshman & Sophomore: $500  
Junior & Senior: $1,000 
MESG: $2,500 
$2,497 $7,226 
NM Public: Tuition only (from the second semester) $2,073 $8,943 
NV $2,500 $2,344 $11,465 
SC Public: $2,000 $3,414 $10,660 
TN $4,000 $4,039 $15,074 
WV 
Public: Tuition & fees 
Private: Equivalent to public amount 
$2,898 $12,441 
Source: U.S. Department of Education (1990-2011). 
Note: Due to data availability, the average tuition in Missouri is tuition for the academic year of 1989-1990 rather than 1987-1988. 
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students and spending more on education. This investment, in turn, attracts high-performing students and 
scholars to their institutions, which enhances the reputations of the colleges. Colleges with high-achieving 
students and scholars then attract more external funding from government and private sectors, and the 
spiral goes on. Because most colleges are nonprofits, they can also spend as much revenue as they have 
(Martin, 2011).  
 
To summarize, colleges seek more revenue to invest in their students, scholars, and facilities to enhance 
their reputation. Because most merit-based aid programs covered a substantial portion of tuition and fees 
for a majority of their state resident students, I hypothesized that colleges attempted to capture this new 
source of revenue by increasing their listed tuition and fees, reducing their own spending on institutional 





Positive Effects of Merit-Based Aid 
 
Researchers have found positive effects from merit-based aid on students’ academic preparation, college 
enrollment, and graduation. First, merit-based aid seems to motivate high school students to work hard to 
meet the academic requirements. After the Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) scholarship 
started in Georgia, the average SAT scores of high school seniors and college freshmen significantly 
increased (Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Henry & Rubenstein, 2002). In Tennessee, the number of 
students who scored at least a 19 on ACT, which was the cut-off score to receive the state’s merit-based aid 
at the time, increased after the implementation of the merit-based aid (Pallais, 2009).  
 
The availability of merit-based aid also increases college enrollment across all racial groups, especially in 
four-year colleges (Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2002). After analyzing the data for seven 
southern states that adopted merit-based aid before 2000, Dynarski (2002) showed that merit-based aid in 
almost all of these states had significant and positive effects on college enrollments. Zhang and Ness (2010) 
argued that merit-based aid kept the best and brightest students in their home states, as research universities, 
which are typically more selective than other types of institutions, experienced the greatest the enrollment 
increases following implementation of merit-based aid.  
 
Furthermore, merit-based aid promotes degree attainment. At the state level, the share of adults with 
college degrees (Dynarski, 2005) and the number of bachelor’s degree holders (Zhang, 2011) have increased 
in states that adopted statewide merit-based aid. At the student level, HOPE scholarship recipients in 
Georgia were more likely to persist and graduate within four years compared to students who lost or never 
received the HOPE scholarship (Henry, Rubenstein, and Bugler, 2004). In West Virginia, Scott-Clayton 
(2011) found that the state’s merit-based aid recipients were more likely to take sufficient credits to graduate 
within four years in order to maintain their merit-based aid than non-recipients.  
 
Unintended Consequences and the Bennett Hypothesis 
 
Despite these positive effects, there are concerns about unintended consequences of merit-based aid. First, 
Heller and Marin (2002, 2004) suggested that merit-based aid could limit college access for racial minority 
students or low-income students due to its sole focus on academic achievement. As a result, a large sum of 
state money is awarded to students who would have gone to college anyway instead of students who really 
need it to attend college. However, Singell Jr., Waddell, and Curs (2004) found that in regions where 
students qualify for the HOPE scholarship, the number and proportion of low-income students have not 
decreased in both two-year and four-year colleges since the HOPE scholarship started. In addition, there is 
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some evidence that merit-based aid actually increases enrollment and degree attainment of both White and 
non-White students (Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2002, 2005). Considering these results, 
merit-based aid appears to have positive effects across racial and income groups.  
 
Another concern regarding merit-based aid is its impact on institutions. Because merit-based aid reduces 
net costs of attending public colleges for a majority of students, it may have affected students’ college choice 
between public and private institutions. Even worse, the availability of statewide merit-based aid may have 
led to public colleges engaging in “rent-seeking” behaviors. Rent-seeking occurs when agents attempt to 
influence the social or political environment so as to guarantee their profits following the instatement of 
government restrictions on economic activities (Krueger, 1974; Pasour, 1987). After states adopt merit-
based aid, colleges may seek to increase their revenue, or “capture rents,” by raising their prices, as 
suggested by the Bennett hypothesis.  
 
To date, only a few studies have examined whether the Bennett hypothesis has held true in the context of 
state merit-based aid. Long (2004) found that private four-year colleges in Georgia directly increased tuition 
and fees, while public four-year colleges indirectly raised their price by increasing room and board charges. 
These price increases were the most pronounced in colleges with many HOPE recipients. In contrast, since 
the inception of Florida’s Bright Futures Scholarship, community colleges in the state have spent more 
money on institutional grants without changing tuition and fees (Calcagno & Alfonso, 2007). According to 
the authors, community colleges were covering their students’ unmet needs (the difference between listed 
tuition and fees and the grants from all sources) because many community college students were only 
eligible for the Florida Medallion Scholars, which provided only 75% of tuition and fees to students who 
satisfied less stringent academic requirements. Results from both studies suggest that colleges are well aware 
of additional revenue state merit-based aid generates and change prices in a way that would increase their 
revenue.  
 
Several studies also tested the Bennett hypothesis against federal aid or state need-based aid. However, 
their results are inconclusive. More revenue from the Federal Pell Grants or federally subsidized loans led to 
tuition increases in public four-year colleges (McPherson & Shapiro, 1991), state flagship universities (Rizzo 
& Ehrenberg, 2004), and both public and private four-year colleges (Singell & Stone, 2007). These results 
suggest that colleges change their tuition in response to changes in federal financial aid. In contrast, Lan and 
Winters (2011) did not find significant tuition changes in colleges that enrolled many Washington D.C. 
residents after the District of Columbia College Access program began.  
 
When researchers test the Bennett hypothesis, it is important that they look at institutional grants in 
addition to listed tuition and fees. Although it is less visible, colleges often change the amount of 
institutional grants in response to government aid. For example, students who received more Federal Pell 
Grants (L. J. Turner, 2012) or students who received federal tax credits (N. Turner, 2012) were awarded 
lower amounts of institutional grants. These results demonstrated that the intended benefit of federal aid 
programs—to ease the financial burden of students and families by subsidizing tuition and fees—was offset 
by decreased institutional grants. 
 
Curs and Dar (2010) showed that colleges responded differently to state financial aid depending on their 
governance structures. Public colleges in states with coordinating governing boards and private colleges, 
both of which enjoy more institutional autonomy, raised their net price in response to increased state aid. In 
contrast, public colleges in states with consolidating boards, which are granted less autonomy, reduced listed 
tuition and increased institutional grants. These findings suggest that there can be many factors that 
moderate the way institutions respond to government financial aid.  
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In summary, colleges and universities respond to federal and state government financial aid policies. 
Their response is more pronounced in colleges where a large number of students benefit from the policy, or 
in colleges with more market power and institutional autonomy over tuition setting. Colleges also change 




Data and Sample 
 
Based on the literature, this study addressed three research questions. First, after the states implemented 
merit-based aid policies, did four-year colleges in merit-based-aid states increase tuition and fees more than 
colleges in states without merit-based aid? Second, after the states implemented merit-based aid policies, did 
four-year colleges in those states reduce the dollar-value of institutional grants awarded per student more 
than colleges in states without merit-based aid? Third, after the states implemented merit-based aid policies, 
did four-year colleges in those states increase room and board charges more than colleges in states without 
merit-based aid?  
 
By looking at all three price measures, this research provides a more complete picture of whether and/or 
how four-year colleges responded to their state’s merit-based aid policy. It is important to examine all three 
prices because colleges sometimes indirectly raise their prices instead of directly increasing their tuition, as 
Long (2004) demonstrated.  
 
In addition, this research examined all thirteen states that have adopted merit-based aid. This allowed me 
to explore whether colleges’ responses differed depending on each state’s merit-based aid design, which has 
rarely been considered in previous studies.  
 
I acquired data from the Integrated Postsecondary Educational Systems (IPEDS) that the National 
Center for Education Statistics collected from 1987 to 2009. IPEDS is the most appropriate existing dataset 
to study postsecondary education institutions because it provides college characteristics, enrollments, and 
financial information for every postsecondary institution that applied for or participated in any federal 
financial aid program authorized by Title IV.  
 
Of the states that implemented statewide merit-based aid (shown in Tables 1 and 2), I did not include 
Alaska, Maryland, and Missouri for the following reasons. Because the Alaska Performance Scholarship 
started in 2010, there were only a few years of data to compare before and after the program 
implementation. I excluded Maryland from the analysis because its merit-based aid program lasted only four 
years. I did not include Missouri because it restricted eligibility to only the top 5% of its resident students, 
which made the program very selective compared to other states’ programs.  
 
I limited my sample to public four-year colleges and nonprofit private four-year colleges across the 
United States. I first excluded for-profit colleges because they may have different pricing policies given their 
explicit goal of making profit and heavy reliance on federal aid. Moreover, a majority of students enrolled in 
for-profit colleges were non-traditional adult students who were ineligible for state merit aid in most states. I 
also omitted two-year colleges because introducing merit-based aid could have different effects on these 
institutions compared to four-year colleges, as illustrated in Calcagno and Alfonso (2007). Some colleges, 
mainly branch campuses or community colleges, were originally classified as two-year institutions, but 
changed into four-year institutions in later years. I treated these colleges as two-year colleges and excluded 
them from my study. Lastly, I dropped specialized institutions (e.g., seminary or art school) and tribal 
colleges, as designated by the Carnegie Classification 2000/2005, because many of these colleges are very 
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small, pursue a specific educational goal, and have different revenue structures compared to four-year 
colleges.  
 
After excluding these colleges, the analysis included 449 public four-year colleges and 840 private four-
year colleges. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of my sample in the academic year of 1990-91. At 
this time, there was no statewide merit-based aid program available, with the exception of the Missouri 
Bright Flight Scholarship which was not considered for this study because it only selected those with the top 
SAT or ACT scores. The top panel in Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for colleges in all 50 states, 
while the bottom panel provides the descriptive statistics only for colleges in Southern states. I compare the 
descriptive statistics of the treatment group to other Southern states because most states in the treatment 
group are located in the South. 
 
Across the country, colleges in future merit-based-aid states charged slightly lower tuition and room and 
board charges, provided less amounts of institutional grants per student, and received less amounts of 
external resources than colleges in non-merit-based-aid states. This pattern was consistent when I focused 
on Southern states, except that public colleges in future merit-based-aid states charged slightly higher tuition 
and fees than public colleges in non-merit-based-aid states. This pre-policy trend adds credibility to the 
argument that many states adopted statewide merit-based aid programs because their colleges charged 





To answer my research questions, I used the difference-in-differences method. The difference-in-differences 
method compares the before-and-after-policy change in an outcome variable for the treatment group to that 
of the control group. For example, in my study, I compared the change in tuition observed in the treatment 
group (colleges whose states implemented merit-based aid policies) to that of the control group (colleges in 
other states that have not adopted merit-based aid policies) four years before and after the introduction of 
merit-based aid. I chose this eight-year window because it took at least four years for a newly adopted merit-
based aid program to be available for all students from freshmen to seniors.  
 
When using the difference-in-differences method, it is important to choose appropriate control groups 
that are similar to the treatment group except in the policy of interest (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). In this 
study, I employed two control groups: 1) colleges located in the neighboring states of the treatment group 
and 2) colleges in all 50 U.S. states. The first control group is colleges located in neighboring states that have 
not adopted merit-based aid programs during the period studied (i.e., four years before and after a treatment 
state implemented merit-based aid). For example, I compared colleges in Georgia to colleges in the rest of 
the South that never adopted merit-based aid from 1989 to 1996. I compared colleges in the treatment 
group states located outside the South (e.g., Michigan) to colleges in states that belong to the same regional 
compact (e.g., the Midwestern Higher Education Compact).  
 
In addition to neighboring states, I also used as a control group colleges in all U.S. states that never 
adopted merit-based aid during the period studied. Previous studies used Southern states as a control group 
because most merit-based aid states are located in the South, and these states are comparable in terms of 
higher education demand and economic condition (Dynarski, 2002; Long, 2004; Zhang & Ness, 2010). 
However, my study looked at thirteen states that adopted merit-based aid programs in different years, and I 
excluded these states from the control group once they adopted merit-based aid. This decision resulted in 
only five states left in the control group for the treatment group that adopted merit-based aid in the mid-
2000s. For this reason, I employed the second control group (colleges in all U.S. states) and checked if the  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Samples in 1990-1991 (in Current Dollars) 
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estimates significantly differed. Using this second control group addressed the sample size issue although it 
may not be as comparable to the treatment group as the first control group was.  
 
I used the statistical equation (1) to answer my research questions. I ran the model separately for public 
and private four-year colleges because these two types of colleges substantially differ in terms of tuition 
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levels and the major source of revenue. I also ran the model separately for each of the thirteen merit-based-
aid states because each state has a different higher education context and merit-based aid program, which 
could lead to different effects across states. In equation (1),  is the dependent variable of institution i 
located in state s in year t. Note that  refers to listed tuition and fees for the first research question, the 
amount of institutional grants awarded per FTE student for the second research question, and room and 
board charges for the third research question. I took a natural logarithm of these dependent variables so that 
I could interpret a coefficient as a percent change as a result of a one-unit change in an independent 
variable. 






In the model above, merit is a dummy variable for each of the treatment states analyzed, and post is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether or not merit-based aid has been adopted in the treatment state. The 
interaction term between these two variables ( merit  post) is the key independent variable of this study. If 
the Bennett hypothesis holds, the coefficient on the interaction term (δ ) will be statistically significant and 
positive for the first and third research questions, suggesting increased tuition and fees and increased room 
and board charges, respectively. For the second research question, the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on the interaction term (δ ) means that colleges reduced the amount of institutional grants per 
student in response to the creation of merit-based scholarships. I also added year (θ ) and state fixed effects 
(φ ) to capture potential year-specific and state-specific effects on college prices.  
X ist is a vector of state-level and college-level covariates that are known to affect tuition and financial 
aid. At the college level, I added a dummy variable that indicates a doctoral-granting institution. I also 
included state appropriation revenue (only for public college), revenue from private sources (such as 
investment return, endowment income, private gifts, grants, and contracts), the number of full-time and 
equivalent (FTE) students, and the number of full-time faculty members. I added these variables because 
selectivity and size of institutions are closely related to the amount of revenue from external sources (Curs & 
Dar, 2010; Long, 2004; Lowry, 2001; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2004; Singell & Stone, 2007). In addition, there 
are several state-level time-varying covariates in the model: the size of young adult population (20 to 24 
years old), state unemployment rates, the percentage of bachelor’s degree holders among the population, per 
capita income, and the total amount of state need-based grants awarded. These state-level covariates are 
related to a state’s higher education demand, which in turn affects college enrollment and tuition levels 
(Cheslock & Hughes, 2011; Lowry, 2001).  
When using a panel dataset, serial correlation is a serious problem that significantly reduces the standard 
error of estimates, and hence, falsely rejects the null hypothesis (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004; 
Wooldridge, 2005). To address this issue, I used cluster-robust standard errors which minimized the impact 
of heteroskedasticity of errors (Drukker, 2003).  
Limitations 
There are some limitations in this study. First, it did not examine why colleges responded to merit-based aid 
in certain ways. Although I explored possible explanations such as governance structure, testing all 
possibilities was outside the scope of this study. Second, it is possible that other factors related to tuition or 
college finance could have occurred in the treatment states at the same time merit-based aid was adopted. 
For example, a state might have adopted performance-based funding or started a statewide need-based 
grant. If any of these events occurred, it also could have affected my estimates.  
*
*
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Results 
 
Changes in Tuition and Fees, Institutional Grants, and Prices 
 
Tables 4 through 7 provide the difference-in-differences estimates. Tables 4 and 5 show the results for 
public four-year colleges using neighboring states and all 50 states as control groups, respectively. Tables 6 
and 7 present the results for private four-year colleges using neighboring states and all U.S. states, 
respectively. Table 8 summarizes all these results. In order to save space, only the coefficient on the 
interaction term between merit-based aid and post-policy dummy variables ( ) are presented.  
 
Table 4 provides coefficients and standard errors for public colleges in each of the thirteen treatment 
states compared to public colleges in their neighboring states. The first column shows the name of each 
treatment state and the sample size used in the model for each state. The next three columns show price 
changes in tuition and fees, the amount of institutional grants per FTE student, and room and board 
charges after each treatment state implemented its merit-based aid program. For example, I used 1,298 
public four-year colleges in total to analyze price changes in response to Arkansas’ Academic Challenge 
Scholarship. After the scholarship was implemented in 1991, public colleges in Arkansas significantly 
increased in-state tuition and room and board charges by 2.1% and 10.3%, respectively. However, they did 
not significantly change the amount of institutional grants compared to public colleges in other Southern 
states. 
 
Overall, colleges in many states experienced changes in the three outcomes of this study: listed tuition 
and fees, the dollar amount of institutional grants per student, and room and board charges (hereafter 
referred to as college prices or simply prices). However, colleges’ responses to the implementation of merit-
based aid differed across states and college types. Due to the heterogeneity in the estimates, I explain a few 
common patterns across states and then discuss two factors that partially explain the heterogeneous 
responses. When discussing my results, I focus on the results that were consistent across the two control 
groups. In general, most estimates especially for public colleges were consistent regardless of control groups 
used. However, estimates tended to be more sensitive when the sample size used in the analysis was 
relatively small (e.g., estimates for room and board charges or private colleges). The abbreviations of states 
with consistent results are bold and italicized in Table 8. 
 
Four-year colleges in several states increased either tuition and fees or room and board charges, if not 
both, after adopting merit-based aid programs. For instance, both public and private four-year colleges in 
Arkansas significantly raised both types of student charges after their state adopted merit-based aid. Public 
colleges in Kentucky, Massachusetts, and South Carolina, as well as private colleges in Georgia, Nevada, and 
New Mexico, also raised their tuition and fees more than their comparison groups. These results showed 
that in many states, colleges raised their student charges in response to the adoption of merit-based aid.  
 
However, the increased student charges do not necessarily mean that the net price students paid out of 
pocket also increased. When I looked at all three outcomes simultaneously, colleges in some states increased 
the amount for institutional aid per student when they raised student charges. For example, public colleges 
in Georgia and Massachusetts, as well as private colleges in New Mexico and Nevada, increased the dollar 
amount of both institutional aid and tuition. If colleges provided more money for institutional aid per 
student, then the negative impact of tuition increases were mitigated to some extent. Moreover, colleges in 
many of the states did not significantly change in all three areas of interest (e.g., Tennessee), or increased 
institutional aid without raising student charges (e.g., Florida). In these states, attending four-year colleges 




Lee: Merit-Based Aid and College Affordability 
Journal of Student Financial Aid  National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators  Vol. 46, N2, 2016 63 
Table 4. Difference-in-Differences Results for Public Colleges (Using Neighboring States) 
 














































































































Note. Every model includes state and year fixed effects and covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors are used.  
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Table 5. Difference-in-Differences Results for Public Colleges (Using All U.S. States) 
 














































































































Note. Every model includes state and year fixed effects and covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors are used. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Table 6. Difference-in-Differences Results for Private Colleges (Using Neighboring States) 
 














































































































Note. Every model includes state and year fixed effects and covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors are used. 
 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Table 7. Difference-in-Differences Results for Private Colleges (Using All U.S. 50 States) 
 














































































































Note. Every model includes state and year fixed effects and covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors are used. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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(AR, KY, MA,  
NV, SC) 
5 
(AR, KY, MA,  
NM, SC) 
4 
(AR, GA, NV,  
NM) 
9 
(AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, 
NV, NM, SC, WV) 
– 3 
(FL, GA, MS) 
3 








(FL, GA, MA, MS) 
4 
(FL, GA, MA, MS) 
7 
(FL, GA, MI, MS, 
NV, NM, WV) 
7 
(FL, GA, MI, MS, 




(NV, NM, WV) 
3 
(AR, LA, SC) 
5 






(AR, GA, MA,  
NM, WV) 
5 
(AR, FL, GA,  
MA, WV) 
4 
(AR, MS, NM,  
SC) 
4 
(AR, FL, MS, SC) 
– 
5 
(LA, MI, NV,  
SC, TN) 
6 
(LA, MI, NV,  
NM, SC, TN) 
3 
(GA, KY, TN) 
6 
(GA, KY, MA,  
MI, NV, NM) 
Note. States whose results are consistent regardless of their control groups are bold and italicized. Neighbors refer to states that 
belong to the same region with the treatment state. For example, neighbors of Tennessee are all other southern states that never 
adopted merit-based aid.  
 
 
Considering all three outcomes within each state, Table 9 summarizes the direction of the net price 
change in each state. With the exception of the last (fifth) category, Table 9 presents the common patterns 
observed in the order of less affordable to more affordable. For example, colleges in the first category raised 
student charges without increasing student aid. This was the worst scenario observed. If students did not 
receive merit-based aid, they would pay higher prices than before, compared to their peer students in other 
states. Public colleges in Arkansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia, as well as private colleges in Arkansas, 
South Carolina, and Louisiana, belonged to this category. Colleges in the second category raised student aid 
in addition to increasing student charges. Although these colleges charged their students more than before, 
the increased aid would most likely help students pay the additional costs for their education.  
 
For the states in the third or fourth category, college education has become more affordable. Colleges in 
the third category increased the amount of student aid without changing student charges. Private colleges in 
Florida and West Virginia fell into this category. After the adoption of merit-based aid, students at these 
colleges had more money to pay their tuition, a cost that did not significantly increase compared to colleges 
in other states. The colleges in the fourth category decreased student charges relative to colleges in other 
states. In other words, after adopting merit-based aid, going to college in these states has been less expensive 
than going to college in other states. Public colleges in five states and private colleges in two states showed 
these results. Moreover, some of these colleges (e.g., public colleges in Florida and Mississippi and private  
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Table 9. Results Summary Table (Common Patterns) 
 
Pattern Description Public Private 
Increased 
student charges 
Colleges increased tuition and/or  
room & board charges without  
raising institutional aid 
3 
(AR, KY, WV) 
3 
(AR, SC, LA) 
Increased 
student charges  
(Increased aid) 
Colleges increased institutional aid  
as well as tuition and/or  




(MS, NV, NM) 
Increased aid 
Colleges increased institutional aid 






Colleges decreased tuition and/or  
room & board charges  
(and increased aid in some cases) 
5 





1) Results are sensitive depending on 
control groups, or 
2) One type of student charges  
(e.g., tuition) increased, while the other 
(e.g., room & board charges) decreased.  
4 
(GA, NV, SC, NM) 
3 
(GA, MA, TN) 
 
 
colleges in Michigan) increased the amount of institutional aid per student. As a result, college education in 
these states could become more affordable than before.  
 
Lastly, for some states I did not have sufficient evidence to determine the overall direction of the net 
price changes. In the fifth category, estimates for some states (e.g., public colleges in New Mexico) were 
sensitive depending on the control group choice. In some instances, colleges in other states showed 
contrasting results between tuition and fees and room and board charges. For example, public colleges in 
Georgia significantly reduced tuition and fees and increased room and board charges. Long (2004) found 
the same results and explained that these contrasts suggested a limited capability of public colleges in 
determining their own tuition. Although this is totally plausible, it is difficult to directly compare the 
percentage point changes between the two price measures (tuition and fees versus room and board charges). 
Therefore, I made a separate category for these states with contrasting estimates and left them as 
inconclusive. 
 
Possible Explanations for Heterogeneous Results 
 
Thus far, I have described a few common patterns in my results and demonstrated the heterogeneity of 
these estimates. My results were strikingly different across states and college types. In order to explain the 
heterogeneity, I explored whether each state’s merit-based aid design, as well as higher education 
governance structures, were related to colleges’ responses. As seen in Tables 1 and 2, eligibility requirements 
and award amounts varied widely across states. These differences in merit-based aid design could provide 
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colleges with different incentives. I hypothesized that colleges whose states set less rigorous requirements 
and provided generous funding were more likely to raise their student charges and reduce the amount of 
institutional aid per student. In contrast, colleges in states with more rigorous requirements and that 
provided less institutional aid would be less likely to raise student charges and reduce institutional aid.  
 
Figure 1 shows states based on the rigorousness of the academic requirements for their merit-based aid 
and the generosity of their funding. The x-axis represents the rigorousness based on the minimum high 
school GPA required, while the y-axis represents the generosity in terms of the percentage of the average 
tuition and fees at in-state public four-year colleges covered by merit-based aid. If a state’s merit-based aid 
program was multi-tiered (e.g., Florida’s Bright Future Scholarships), I used the least rigorous standard and 
the minimum award amount. In Massachusetts and Michigan, scholarship eligibility has been determined by 
their state exam scores or standardized test scores rather than high school GPAs. Because students in these 
two states were required to be within the top 25% on these tests to be eligible for merit-based aid, I 
assumed that this requirement was more rigorous than having a 3.0 GPA in high school.  
 
As shown in Figure 1, states on the top left corner (e.g., Arkansas and Louisiana) covered almost 100% 
of tuition and fees in public four-year colleges, and set the minimum requirement for eligibility around a 2.5 
GPA. Hence, I hypothesized that colleges in these two states would be more likely to take advantage of the 
system by raising student charges and/or reducing institutional aid. In contrast, states on the far right 
bottom corner (e.g., Massachusetts and Michigan) limited the eligibility around the top 25% within their 
state and provided only a portion of tuition and fees. Because the number of eligible students was very 
limited, I expected colleges in these states not to raise student charges and/or reduce institutional aid. These 
hypotheses partially explained the results. Among the four states that I mentioned above, the hypotheses 
explained the results for Arkansas and Michigan. Colleges in Arkansas (with large incentive) raised student 
charges without increasing institutional aid, while colleges in Michigan (with small incentive) decreased 
student charges. However, the hypotheses did not explain results for Louisiana and Massachusetts well. 
Although merit-based aid provided 100% of the tuition and fees for students with a 2.5 high school GPA, 
public colleges in Louisiana decreased student charges. In Massachusetts, public colleges raised all three 
price measures although their state merit-based aid covered tuition only, leaving a large portion of required 
fees unsubsidized. These results suggest that colleges do not always respond to the incentives embedded in 
merit-based aid programs.  
 
Moreover, private colleges significantly changed their prices in some states, even though students 
enrolled in private colleges were not eligible for the states’ merit-based aid. Of the thirteen states examined 
in this study, three states (Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Nevada) limited the merit-based aid eligibility to 
students in their public colleges. If private colleges in these states had responded to their state’s merit-based 
aid (or incentive generated from the aid), they would not have increased their tuition due to the possible loss 
of students. However, private colleges in New Mexico and Nevada increased their tuition, as well as the 
amount of institutional aid per student. These responses in private colleges also call into question whether 
colleges change their prices in response to merit-based aid. 
 
Another factor that can explain the heterogeneous responses observed is whether individual institutions 
in a state have the capability of setting their own tuition costs. As Long (2005) mentioned, public colleges 
have less authority over their tuition than private colleges. Instead, their tuition levels are monitored or 
determined by many stakeholders such as state legislature, state higher education agency, or system board 
(Bell, Carnahan, & L’Orange, 2011). Following Curs and Dar (2010), I hypothesized that the way public 
colleges responded to merit-based aid was different depending on the level of autonomy that individual 
colleges had regarding their tuition levels. In particular, colleges with less autonomy would reduce their 
student charges or increase the amount of institutional aid per student so that their tuition policy can be 
aligned with their state initiative.  
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Figure 1. Academic Requirements and Award Amounts of Merit-Based Aid 
 
 
Table 10 provides information about higher education governance structure in each state. Based on the 
survey conducted by State Higher Education Executive Officers, panel (A) shows the agency that had the 
primary authority over tuition setting within a state when its merit-based aid was adopted. The information 
is placed in the order of the level of centralization, from the most centralized (e.g., state legislature) to the 
least centralized (e.g., individual institutions).  
 
Panel (B) provides the type of higher education governance structure in each state at the time of merit-
based aid adoption. As Richardson et al. (1999) explained, the decision-making process is more centralized 
in a state with a consolidating board, while individual institutions have more autonomy in a state with a 
coordinating board or a planning agency. According to both panels, state agencies (or external boards) 
appeared to have more influence on public colleges in Florida, Louisiana, Georgia, Mississippi, and Nevada 
than other states. Of the five states with a more centralized form of governance, public colleges in Florida, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi decreased student charges and sometimes increased the amount of institutional 
aid per student. Public colleges in the other two states (Georgia and Nevada) showed mixed results. In 
addition, anecdotal evidence suggested that there was an initiative to keep public college tuition low in 
Florida and Georgia because tuition increases would directly call for more funding for merit-based aid 
(Rasmussen, 2003). Although higher education governance structure did not perfectly explain the way 
colleges responded to merit-based aid, it explained why public colleges in some states might not be able to 
raise their net prices in response to their state merit-based aid. 
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Table 10. Higher Education Governance Structure 
 
(A) Primary Authority over Tuition 
Primary authority States 
State legislature FL, LA 
Statewide agency for multiple systems GA, KY, MA, NM, NV  
Governing boards for individual systems TN 
Individual institutions AR, MI, MS, SC, WV 
(B) Higher Education Governance Structure 
Structure States 
Consolidating board FL, GA, MS, NV  
Regulatory coordinating board with budget authority AR, KY, LA, MA, NM, SC, TN, WV 
Planning agency MI 
Source: Panel (A) Christal (1997); Rasmussen (2003); Bell, Carnahan, & L’Orange (2011), Panel (B) Doyle (2013).  
Note. Higher education governance structure implemented at the time of adoption of merit-based aid (or the closest year, if not 





As described above, I found that both public and private colleges in many states significantly changed 
tuition and fees, the amount of institutional grants per student, and room and board charges in response to 
the creation of merit-based aid. However, I cannot entirely rule out the possibility that my treatment states 
(i.e., states that have adopted merit-based aid) have a tendency to change their prices more than the control 
states regardless of their state merit-based aid policy. In the appendix, I present the results from the 
falsification test that examined whether colleges in each of the treatment states significantly changed their 
prices more than their control groups at least six years before or after their state merit-based aid was 
implemented. Although estimates varied widely across states, the estimates for some states were still 
statistically significant and consistent to the main results. These results suggest that colleges in the treatment 
states were more likely to raise their student charges or decrease the amount of institutional aid per student 
even when merit-based aid was not available, and the main results might just reflect these overall trends. The 
results from the falsification test again support the main finding of this study: The adoption of merit-based 
aid does not necessarily lead colleges in most states to take advantage of their state merit-based aid by raising 
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Discussion 
 
As college tuition has increased more rapidly than family income, financial aid plays a critical role in 
students’ college decisions. Both federal and state governments spend an increasing amount of money in 
order to make college education affordable. Although it appears that an increase in government aid is 
inevitable in order to keep pace with rising tuition, there is a concern that more aid may lead to tuition 
increase. If so, increasing government aid may help colleges earn more revenue rather than improve college 
affordability.  
 
My study showed that this was not the case when it came to statewide merit-based aid. In response to 
statewide merit-based aid, colleges significantly changed tuition and fees, the amount of institutional grants 
per student, and room and board charges. However, these price changes did not always increase the net 
price that students actually paid for their education. For example, public colleges in some states that adopted 
merit-based aid did not significantly raise their tuition and fees, and private colleges in many merit-based-aid 
states increased the amount of institutional grants per students. The direction and magnitude of college 
responses differed across states, but each program’s academic requirements and award amounts were not 
always related to the way colleges responded to merit-based aid. State higher education governance structure 
explained the way colleges responded to merit-based aid to some extent.  
 
These results can be interpreted in two ways. First, the adoption of merit-based aid does not necessarily 
make our public colleges more expensive in most states. Although colleges in a few states significantly raised 
tuition and/or room and board charges, some of them also increased institutional aid per student. 
Moreover, public colleges in many states either decreased or did not significantly change tuition and fees. 
Considering these results, attending public college in most merit-based-aid states has become more 
affordable for students eligible for merit-based aid. As listed tuition and fees have remained stable or 
decreased in many states, receiving merit-based aid helps students pay for their education. If these students 
received financial aid from other sources (e.g., Federal Pell Grants) in addition to their merit-based aid, the 
adoption of merit-based aid would significantly reduce their unmet needs. Even for students who were not 
eligible for the aid programs, the introduction of merit-based aid did not significantly raise the cost of 
attending public four-year colleges in most states.  
 
Second, colleges may have used the additional revenue from state merit-based scholarships to subsidize 
their students rather than to reduce the amount of institutional grants per student and secure more revenue. 
Both public and private colleges in many states significantly increased the dollar value of institutional grants 
that each student received. Although it is not clear to whom these colleges distributed the additional 
institutional aid money, they might have spent it on subsidizing out-of-state students or needy students who 
were not eligible for state merit-based scholarships. In either case, the creation of state merit-based 
scholarships may have allowed these colleges to provide more institutional grants and enhance college 
affordability for their students.  
 
Finally, based on my findings, the Bennett hypothesis does not always hold in the context of state merit-
based aid. The Bennett hypothesis assumes that colleges attempt to maximize their utility by raising tuition 
in response to increases in government financial aid, up to the point where it does not harm their 
reputation. However, this study showed that colleges in many states did not significantly increase their 
tuition and fees. Moreover, colleges were not responsive to the incentive embedded in their state’s merit-
based aid programs, with the exception of a couple of states. This result further calls into question the 
validity of the Bennett hypothesis in the context of merit-based aid. The fact that some states intentionally 
kept college costs low at their public colleges suggests that individual institutions might not be capable of 
raising their tuition even if they would like to.  
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Practical Implications 
 
In summary, this study demonstrates that there is little empirical evidence to support the Bennett hypothesis 
in the context of statewide merit-based aid. This finding has implications for state legislators and campus 
financial aid officials. Combined with previous studies (e.g., Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 
2005), research shows that merit-based aid increases college attendance and attainment without raising 
tuition prices. State legislators may use the evidence as a foundation for continuing their state merit-based 
aid or expanding their programs. In addition, results from this study can be also considered when state 
legislators should prioritize their higher education budget. It is timely, given that several states have 
considered or implemented tightening their eligibility requirements for merit-based aid due to budget 
constraints (Postal, 2014; Sisk, 2014).  
 
However, it is still important to note that this result does not occur in vacuum. Without appropriate state 
monitoring, colleges may respond differently to government financial aid, possibly in a way that increases 
their revenue as demonstrated in Turner’s research (2012). Hence, I recommend that policymakers and state 
legislators monitor changes in college prices when a new financial aid program is implemented. In addition 
to tuition and fees, policy makers should pay attention to changes in room and board charges and 
institutional grants. Although these prices are directly related to college affordability, policymakers and the 
public rarely monitor them.  
 
Lastly, campus officials should consider to whom colleges distribute their institutional grants. Because 
many students in public colleges are eligible for statewide merit-based aid that covers a substantial portion 
of tuition and fees, public colleges have more flexibility in spending their institutional grants. When financial 
aid practitioners make a decision, they need to pay special attention to two groups of students: students 
from low-income families and students who lose eligibility for merit-based aid. Many low-income students 
not only lack financial resources to pay their tuition but also have grades that are too low for statewide 
merit-based aid eligibility. As a result, many of them still have difficulty paying tuition even though their 
state governments have a generous merit-based aid program. Such students are still eligible for federal and 
state need-based aid, but award amounts from need-based aid are often insufficient to pay tuition and fees 
in most four-year institutions. In addition, many merit-based aid recipients lose their merit aid after a couple 
of years because they fail to maintain their GPA above a renewal eligibility requirement (Tennessee Higher 
Education Commission, 2015). It is difficult for these students to find another source of financial aid 
because most institutional aid award decisions are made before they enter their college. Given these 
possibilities, financial aid practitioners need to secure a portion of institutional grants for low-income 
students who are not eligible for merit-based aid in the first place and merit-based-aid recipients who lose 





This study tested the Bennett hypothesis against statewide merit-based aid by examining whether four-year 
colleges changed listed tuition and fees, the dollar amount of institutional grants per student, and room and 
board charges after the implementation of merit-based aid. Results from this study suggest that there is little 
reason to anticipate that the adoption of merit-based aid will lead to rising college prices. Colleges in most 
merit-based aid states neither significantly raised their tuition and fees nor decreased their institutional grants 
per student after their states implemented merit-based aid programs.  
 
Although this study contributes to the literature by exploring institutional responses to merit-based aid, 
there remain more questions to be answered in order to understand the economic behavior of colleges. 
Above all, future research needs to address potential factors that affect the way colleges respond to the 
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creation or expansion of government financial aid. Second, future research needs to examine to whom 
colleges in merit-based-aid states distribute their institutional grants. Did colleges spend their money on 
students who already received merit-based aid in order to supplement their unmet needs, or on students 
who were not eligible for merit-based aid such as low-achieving students or nonresident students? Exploring 
these questions will provide another important, but mostly missing, piece to the puzzle of how colleges 







Nexus: Connecting Research to Practice 
• Results suggest that there is little evidence that adopting a statewide merit-based aid 
program leads colleges to raise student charges or decrease the amount of institutional 
grants. State legislators and policymakers may use this evidence to advocate for continuing 
or expanding their state merit-based aid. 
• Legislators and policymakers should keep monitoring changes in student charges and 
institutional aid after their state governments starts a new financial aid program or expands 
an existing one. In particular, they should pay attention to changes in the amount of 
institutional grants per student and room and board charges. These prices clearly affect 
college affordability, but tend to be overlooked by the public and policymakers. 
• Campus-level financial aid practitioners should secure institutional grants for low-income 
students and students who lose state merit-based aid in later years. Although these 
students may still be eligible for federal and state need-based aid, award amounts from 
need-based aid are often not sufficient to pay tuition and fees in most four-year colleges. 
In addition, it is difficult for these students to get additional institutional grants because 
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Appendix. Falsification Test 
Table A1. Falsification Test Results (Public 4-Year Colleges) 
 
State 
(Available Years) Control Groups 




Room & Board 
Charges 
(3) 
Arkansas Neighboring 57% N/A 0% 
(7 years) All 57% N/A 0% 
Florida Neighboring 100% 0% N/A 
(1 year) All N/A 0% 0% 
Georgia Neighboring 100% 0% 80% 
(5 years) All 100% 0% 80% 
Kentucky Neighboring 100% N/A N/A 
(2 years) All 100% N/A N/A 
Louisiana Neighboring N/A N/A 0% 
(1 year) All N/A N/A 0% 
Massachusetts Neighboring N/A N/A N/A 
(8 years) All 37.5% 87.5% 25% 
Michigan Neighboring N/A N/A N/A 
(3 years) All 33% N/A 0% 
Mississippi Neighboring 100% 0% N/A 
(2 years) All 100% 0% N/A 
Nevada Neighboring N/A N/A N/A 
(3 years) All N/A N/A N/A 
New Mexico Neighboring N/A N/A N/A 
(1 year) All N/A 0% N/A 
South Carolina Neighboring 0% N/A 0% 
(1 year) All 0% N/A 0% 
Tennessee Neighboring N/A N/A 50% 
(7 years) All N/A N/A N/A 
West Virginia Neighboring N/A N/A 0% 
(5 years) All N/A N/A N/A 
Note. I ran the same model as specified in equation (1) for all years available at least six years from the actual implementation year. 
For example, Arkansas implemented merit-based aid policy in 1991. Thus, I set its false implementation year as every year from 
1998 to 2004, ran my model for each of the false years, and checked whether the result was consistent with the main result. The 
percentages in the table indicate the percentage of false years that show consistent results among all available false years. N/A 
(not applicable) indicates that the main result is not statistically significant.  
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Appendix–Continued. Falsification Test 
Table A2. Falsification Test Results (Private 4-Year Colleges) 
 
State 
(Available Years) Control Groups 




Room & Board 
Charges 
(3) 
Arkansas Neighboring 57% 43% 86% 
(7 years) All 86% 57% 100% 
Florida Neighboring N/A 0% N/A 
(1 year) All 0% 0% 0% 
Georgia Neighboring 40% 20% 20% 
(5 years) All 40% 20% 20% 
Kentucky Neighboring N/A N/A 0% 
(2 years) All 100% N/A N/A 
Louisiana Neighboring N/A 0% N/A 
(1 year) All N/A 0% N/A 
Massachusetts Neighboring N/A N/A N/A 
(8 years) All 75% 25% 62.5% 
Michigan Neighboring N/A N/A N/A 
(3 years) All 0% 100% 33% 
Mississippi Neighboring N/A 0% 100% 
(2 years) All N/A 0% 100% 
Nevada Neighboring 100% 100% N/A 
(3 years) All N/A N/A N/A 
New Mexico Neighboring N/A N/A N/A 
(1 year) All 100% 100% 0% 
South Carolina Neighboring N/A 100% 0% 
(1 year) All 0% 100% 0% 
Tennessee Neighboring N/A N/A N/A 
(7 years) All N/A N/A N/A 
West Virginia Neighboring 0% 0% N/A 
(5 years) All N/A N/A N/A 
Note. I ran the same model as specified in equation (1) for all years available at least six years from the actual implementation year. 
For example, Arkansas implemented merit-based aid policy in 1991. Thus, I set its false implementation year as every year from 
1998 to 2004, ran my model for each of the false years. N/A (not applicable) indicates that the main result is not statistically 
significant.  
 
 
